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A key question concerning social norms is whether norms that are bad for its members
can survive. This paper argues that when identical workers have the outside option to join
a competing ¯rm with a di®erent norm, good norms can exist only in the presence of bad
norms. With non contractible e®ort, agents cannot credibly commit to cooperation when all
outside options are equally good. This is proposed as a rationale for endogenous strati¯cation
of coexisting norms and corporate cultures. The framework naturally gives rise to authority
relations within ¯rms: seniors earn higher wages than entering juniors. However, authority
is limited and does not eradicate the strati¯cation of norms.
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1 Introduction
Social norms play an important role in economics and social sciences.1 Peer groups, Ma¯a gangs,
fraternities, religions, ¯rms,... have all very di®erent rules of behavior to which members voluntarily
adhere. A fraternity member who does not agree with the terms on how to ¯nance the services
provided, is free to leave and join another association. Even members of religious groups are
reported to change membership (turnover in cults is extremely high; 40% of all Protestants leave
to another faith). Firms have workers coming and going. Some ¯rms are known to have a strong
corporate culture with high employee cooperation, others have a weak culture. This paper is an
attempt to model norms of cooperation, while individuals can choose which norm to belong to. A
¤A Work in progress. I would like to thank Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Boyan Jovanovic, Omer Moav,
Rafael Rob and Tuomas Takalo for discussion and comments. MIT generously provided a stimulating environment
while part of this project was undertaken. Financial Support from the European Commission and DGES is gratefully
acknowledged.
1Knack and Keefer (1997) show that the average of a country's norms (measured as trust or social capital)
signi¯cantly increases its per capita growth rate in cross country comparisons.
1member's willingness to adhere to the norm is determined by the outside option of joining other
norms available in the economy. In understanding norms as a social phenomenon, attention is
naturally drawn towards the di®erence in characteristics and behavior between norms. The theory
of conventions (see for example Young (1993)) explains norms as a device for the coordination of
actions in a setting where there is no interaction between members of separate societies (familiar
examples include driving left or right on the road, standing up or sitting down through the entire
game in a sports stadium). An equally signi¯cant issue, hitherto ignored by economists, is what
the e®ect is of competition between norms. Social Norms are as much a societal feature with
interaction between norms through mobility of its members. Can social norms that are bad for its
members survive? In the presence of unlimited entry, and free mobility, will social norms tend to
become uniform because citizens will choose the successful norms only?
In this paper, a social norm is referred to as a set of common characteristics, behavior, beliefs,...
that apply to a subgroup of society, in our case the ¯rm. Each individual ¯rm has a social norm
associated with it. We believe that applying our theory to the case where the subgroup is a ¯rm,
is justi¯ed for two reasons: 1. Empirical evidence suggests that norms within a ¯rm are strongly
related to productivity;2 2. Firms operate in an environment where there is su±cient mobility
of its members. By choosing the ¯rm as our focus of attention, we concentrate on the interplay
between private incentives and group incentives within the social norm.3 That does not imply
that the individual ¯rm's norm stands alone, independent of other ¯rms' norms in the economy.
Competing norms can only exist if it is an equilibrium in the economy as a whole. Unlike a legal
norm that is enforced by law using coercive sanctions, the social norm is the result of a (voluntary)
implicit contract.
Consider the basic components of the competing norms model in more detail. 1. Each ¯rm is
characterized by a social norm: one ¯rm, one norm. 2. The norm of a ¯rm is determined by
the contribution of e®ort of each of its members. The stage game builds on HolmstrÄ om's (1982)
analysis of moral hazard in teams. Firms have a production technology where a ¯xed number of
employees jointly provide e®ort. E®ort is not contractible, but after production is realized, output
is observed. The immediate private bene¯t is determined by a budget balancing sharing rule. 3.
The model is dynamic. Because all workers are non-myopic and forward looking, in their actions
they trade o® current gains and losses with the discounted future changes in value. 4. Matching
is endogenous. After realization of the output, a worker will either remain in the ¯rm or leave the
2Kotter and Heskett (1992) and Cappelli and Neumark (1999) ¯nd strong evidence of heterogeneity of norms
(corporate culture) between ¯rms. In addition, both studies show a signi¯cant relation between productivity and a
measure for the quality of the norm.
3The value of a ¯rm's social norm can be referred to as its aggregate social capital (as introduced by Loury
(1977), and Coleman (1990)). However, it will be the individual (or behavioral) social capital that determines costs
and bene¯ts of membership, and whether an individual member in the group is willing to comply with the ¯rm's
norm or not. This distinction between an individual based as opposed to a group based de¯nition of norms, is
drawn from Loury (1977) and Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (1999). We also adopt their view that a
¯rm's norm is only as good as the aggregate of it's members' individual social capital.
2¯rm after which she is randomly matched to a new ¯rm. Endogenous separation can occur for
two reasons: either because she decides to leave the ¯rm or because of punishment: she is made
redundant. In addition, there is an exogenous separation probability. Any separated employee
randomly draws a new ¯rm. There is no friction in this model as matching is instantaneous (the
Poisson arrival rate of a match is in¯nity) and employees prefer any match for one period than
receiving zero utility from remaining unmatched.
In the model described above, a worker joining a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation gets a higher
level of utility by cooperating than she would get in a ¯rm with a norm of non-cooperation.
However, given her belief that all other employees in that ¯rm will cooperate, she can get even
higher utility by free riding through less e®ort. In the static game this is a dominant strategy. In
the dynamic game, whether this is a optimal strategy or not depends on her expectations about
her future utility. Suppose we have an equilibrium where all ¯rms have a norm of cooperation.
Free riding implies she will be made redundant at the end of the period. When separated, she
is instantaneously matched to a new ¯rm, drawn from the distribution of ¯rms. Given the belief
that all ¯rms have norms of cooperation, with probability one she will be matched to a ¯rm with
a norm of cooperation. Her future value after separation is not lower by being rematched. This
implies that free riding, which yields a higher °ow utility, is a dominant strategy. An equilibrium
where all ¯rms cooperate does not exist because it is not individually incentive compatible.
When a fraction of ¯rms do and the complementary fraction do not cooperate, then the option
value of defecting when matched to a cooperating ¯rm depends on the expected value of being
rematched. If there are su±cient ¯rms with a norm for non-cooperation, then the expected value
of rematching is proportionally lower than the option value of cooperating and remaining in the
good norm ¯rm. If the immediate gain from free riding is not larger than the expected discounted
future loss, it is a dominant strategy for an employee matched to a high norm ¯rm to cooperate
and not separate. Consider the equilibrium where each employee adheres to this strategy when
matched to a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation, and free rides with immediate separation in all
other ¯rms. We want to verify for deviations by all employees. First, given this belief, a strategy
of cooperation without separation when matched to a cooperative norm is incentive compatible.
No employee in a cooperating ¯rm can gain from deviating. Second, when matched to a ¯rm with
a norm for non-cooperation, the best response when all free ride is to free ride. Providing e®ort
above the static Nash level would yield less utility (by de¯nition of the Nash equilibrium). In
addition, separation is a dominant strategy as the expected value of rematching is higher than the
value of remaining in a low cooperation ¯rm: there is a fraction of high cooperation norms around
that yield a higher utility than the low norms. Since no employee gains from deviating, this belief
is con¯rmed by the equilibrium actions.
This is the main result of the competing norms model. A norm of cooperation can exist only if
there is a su±cient number of ¯rms with a norm of non-cooperation. Though cooperation implies a
positive externality within the ¯rm, it also has a negative external e®ect on all other ¯rms through
3the improved outside option of the workers in all other ¯rms.4 Despite the fact that all agents are
identical, norms are heterogeneous and as a result there is a wage di®erential across ¯rms. The
wage gap results in a higher degree of turnover in low e®ort ¯rms. Employees in the low norm
¯rm separate as quickly as possible in order to try and match a high norm ¯rm. Note also that
the wage di®erential occurs for identical workers, while at the same time it is necessary to sustain
incentive compatibility and hence equilibrium.
A result new to the literature follows from extending the model to allow for a market for authority.
With exogenous sharing rules, new entrants in a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation receive a strictly
higher option value than in a low norm ¯rm. Senior incumbents can extract some of the rents
by setting the sharing rule such that the junior entrant is still willing to enter. This type of
"backloading" or "performance bonds" have in the past been proposed as a solution to these
dynamic incentives problems: a market for junior job openings determines the wage-tenureschedule
and makes entrants indi®erent between good and bad ¯rms.5 The contribution here is to show
that such a market for authority does not necessarily result in the indi®erence between the option
value of entering a good and that of a bad ¯rm. It is shown that limited authority arises because
lowering the entrant's share of the cooperative output also lowers her share when she deviates.
Lowering the share violates the incentive compatibility constraint of the new entrant, and no ¯rm
¯nds it optimal to do so. This is the case when exogenous separation is relatively low compared to
the discount rate. The result is that even in the presence of a market of authority, junior workers
are not indi®erent between the option value of good and bad ¯rms, and that strati¯cation of ¯rm
norms persists.
These results are compatible with empirical ¯ndings of heterogeneity in incomes amongst obser-
vationally equivalent workers. Krueger and Summers (1988) ¯nd evidence against explanations
based on unmeasured di®erences in ability across industries. This suggests that competing norms
may help explain endogenous heterogeneity. In addition, their analysis shows that turnover and
wages for observationally identical workers are negatively related, and that the wage structure is
highly correlated with job tenure. Both these facts ¯t the competing norms model: bad norm
¯rms pay low wages and have high turnover, and wage-tenure schedules for identical workers arise
naturally in good norm ¯rms.
This paper is related to a large literature in economics on social norms. The theory of conventions
(Young (1993)) proposes an explanation for the existence of social norms that is based on coordina-
tion. When there are multiple Nash equilibria, a convention (e.g. driving on the left) coordinates
4Eeckhout and Jovanovic (1998) show that inequality necessarily arises in a dynamic framework, when an
economy-wide production externality involves higher moments of the distribution of types. This is the case in our
model: low norm ¯rms induce a positive externality while high norm ¯rms have a negative external e®ect. Note
that this is not the case for example in standard endogenous growth models where only the mean of the distribution
of types enters the externality. In such a framework, inequality has no real e®ect.
5Because of this indi®erence, no worker is better o® than any other (irrespective of the ¯rm in which she works),
but that does not imply the bad norm ¯rms are eradicated.
4beliefs and actions, just like a focal point. The extensive literature following this interpretation has
a long standing tradition dating back to Arrow's (1973) application to discrimination.6 Competing
norms di®er from conventions in three substantial aspects. First, conventions derive behavior that
applies to an economy as a whole rather than to a subgroup of the economy. Roughly speaking,
a norm relates to a convention as culture relates to society.7 Second, mobility between di®erent
conventions is not modeled. Third, the theory of conventions is about homogeneous (because
coordinated) behavior within an economy. In contrast, the competing norms model provides a
rationale for observed heterogeneity and strati¯cation within the same economy.
Surprisingly, not much theoretical work has been done on competing norms. The line of research
that provides most of the fundamental building blocks of our model is the work on the theory
of repeated games. The main result in this literature8 is formulated as the folk theorem: any
individually rational payo® can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium for high enough
discount factors. Not only has this been shown to hold for a ¯xed set of players, but also for
randomly matched players as long as there is some aggregate information available.9 Most relevant
to our model is the work on the folk theorem with endogenous matching and without information
°ows. Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996) make important contributions by showing that
in such an environment, cooperation can exist where the behavior is characterized by a gradually
increasing degree of cooperation. Greif (1993) ¯nds evidence for this practice and for endogenous
matching in early trade relations in the Magreb. Ghosh and Ray use exogenous heterogeneity
to model the economy: some traders are irrational and are never willing to cooperate. Through
gradually increasing degrees of cooperation, rational players can learn the type of their partner.
This work shows that the strategy described above, when commonly adopted by all agents in the
economy (i.e. a convention), yields cooperation. Neither of these papers on endogenous matching
takes up the main concern here - whether bad norms of low cooperation can exist in the presence
of norms of high cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the competing norms model is presented.
Given exogenous sharing rules, in section 3 the model is solved and the main result, strati¯cation of
6Conventions have also provided an explanation for history and belief dependent equilibria in several dynamic
settings: customs in the marriage market (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992)), training and turnover di®erentials
(Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)), corruption (Tirole (1996)) and corporate culture (Kreps (1990) and Carillo and
Gromb (1999)).
7" [...] society provides the larger reference groups and culture the local reference groups with respect to which
norms [...] operate. Culture is local and allows for strong bonds to a small number of persons. Society is global
and allows for weaker ties to a larger number of persons.", Elster (1989), p. 250.
8See Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for most of the results in the case of repeated interaction between the same
players.
9Rosenthal (1979) shows that cooperation can be sustained through the evolution of reputation. Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1990) derive a similar result where the information available is much less speci¯c and is transmitted
as an economy wide social norm. Random matching can also result in cooperation without such information as
long as the populations is small enough: Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) show this using contagion strategies,
i.e. punishments that unravel and spread through the whole population fast enough so as to impose su±cient
punishment.
5norms, is derived. This is illustrated with an example and further discussed with some comparative
statics results. In section 4, the market for authority is introduced. Though wage-tenure schedules
arise naturally, authority is limited and does not eradicate strati¯cation. The robustness of the
model to the introduction of capital, general monitoring technologies, general sharing rules and
renegotiation is discussed in section 5. In section 6, the implications for the model from extensions
to include heterogeneous agents and complementary inputs in production are considered. Finally,
some concluding remarks are made.
2 The Competing Norms Model
In this section, the basic model is presented. We describe the incentives employees face when
joining a ¯rm with a certain social norm, and de¯ne equilibrium.
Workers, Firms and the Stage Game. The economy is populated with an in¯nite number
of identical workers. The set of workers W has measure 1 and each worker is interpreted as an
in¯nitesimally small subset of W. Production occurs in ¯rms of a ¯xed and ¯nite number of m > 2
worker. Index workers within a ¯rm by i = 1;:::;m: The set of all ¯rms is given by N and has
measure 1
m: A generic ¯rm is referred to as n 2 N. For the purpose of the characterization below,
consider the partition fC;Dg of N, where c 2 C is a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation and d 2 D
is a ¯rm with a norm of non-cooperation.
We want to capture the notion of joint production. The stage game is therefore as HolmstrÄ om's
(1982) moral hazard in teams model. Total output y produced in a ¯rm is a function of all
individuals' e®ort. Let ei be worker i's level of e®ort and let e = (e1;:::;em) be the vector of all
e®ort levels in a ¯rm n: The ¯rm's total output produced y = Q(e) is deterministic and symmetric
in ei: Workers receive a share si(Q);8i of total output. The utility cost of e®ort to each individual
is C(ei), with C convex. The utility of agent i is given by
ui = si(Q(e)) ¡ C(ei) (1)
Given the sharing rule, agents choose their level of e®ort ei; they produce, and in function of the
vector e; output Q is realized. E®ort is not contractible, which gives rise to the moral hazard
problem. Ex ante shares rules are binding because they are contracted, and ex post output is
perfectly observed.
In a competitive environment, ¯rms' pro¯ts are zero. Given a technology without physical capital,
it follows that the total wage bill is equal to total production. We have chosen this simple pro-
duction function to economize on notation. In section 5, the model is shown to be robust to the
introduction of a production function with physical capital in addition to e®ort. Throughout the
paper, the following assumption is maintained: the sharing rule fsi(Q)g satis¯es Balanced Budget:
Pm
i=1si(Q) = Q:
6HolmstrÄ om (1982) shows that the solution to the static game with budget balancing sharing rules
is ine±cient. Given the vector of e®ort choices by all other workers e¡i;8 ¡ i(6= i) 2 n, the
best response correspondence of worker i satis¯es argmaxei fsi (Q(ei;e¡i)) ¡ C(ei)g: The Nash
equilibrium e®ort e¤
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Theorem 1 (HolmstrÄ om) There do not exist sharing rules fsi(Q)g which satisfy
P
isi(Q) = Q,
and which yield eo
i as a Nash equilibrium in the non cooperative game with payo®s uo
i:
Would all workers cooperate and provide optimal e®ort levels eo, then an individual best response










yield ud.10 As a corollary to the theorem it follows that for a given sharing rule, equilibrium e®ort
e¤ < eo is suboptimal and that ud > uo > u¤. The theorem holds for a general production function
and for general sharing rules.
The ine±ciency result crucially hinges on the assumption of budget balancing sharing rules. A
large part of the literature has given attention to studying incentives in environments where this
assumption can berelaxed, for exampleinvolving an independent principal (see HolmstrÄ om (1982)).
Perhaps of equal importance is the interaction between joint production and mobility across ¯rms.
Our analysis is an attempt to complement the incentives approach.11 The objective here is to ¯nd
solutions for the moral hazard problem even in environments where the budget is balanced. This
is the case for example where it is not possible to involve a completely independent principal. Any
dependent principal needs to be considered as one of the employees, which brings us back to the
ine±ciency. In the case of partners in a law ¯rm for example, partners are both the owners and
employees.
Matching and Monitoring. Consider now the repeated game, where utility that is delayed
for one unit of time is discounted at the common rate 1 + r. Time is continuous, and the ¯rms
of m workers are formed for one period. Periods of di®erent ¯rms overlap. At the end of the
period, output Q is realized and shared according to the sharing rule fsi(Q)g; contracted upon
ex ante. At the end of the stage game, each employee decides whether to stay in the current ¯rm
or to separate. When separated, a random match with a new ¯rm is formed immediately.12 This
captures the notion of competing norms. Any employee can opportunistically execute her outside










11A similarly complementary approach has been taken by Meyer (1994) in studying learning in task assignment
of team members.
12There is no friction and no agents is ever unmatched. Remaining unmatched with zero utility is an option, but
never individually rational.
7The decision to separate is bilateral. This is the punishment device that employees in a ¯rm have
over their colleagues. Underlying the punishment is the monitoring technology. After observation
of Q; monitoring implies that the ¯rm has some information about each individual employee's
e®ort contribution. We assume that with probability 1; the ¯rm knows which of the employees
has provided e®ort below the optimal level.13 In addition to endogenous separation - either from
punishment or opportunism -, there is an exogenous probability ® with which partners separate.
The parameter ® is the arrival rate of a Poisson process.
Social Norms and Equilibrium. Loosely speaking, a social norm is a totality of common
characteristics, behavior patterns, beliefs,... that applies to each ¯rm individually. More precisely,
the social norm consists of the strategy or the behavior rule that workers follow within the ¯rm.
It is a full contingent plan of action: for a given history, in each period workers choose e®ort and,
after realization of Q; they decide whether or not to terminate the partnership. Of course, we will
not be looking for just any set of strategies that constitute a ¯rm's norm, but those that are an
equilibrium, both within the ¯rm and in an economy as a whole. We return to equilibrium in more
detail below.
The interest here is in equilibria where a norm of cooperation within some ¯rms can be maintained,
despite the non-cooperative outcome in the static game. As is the case in the folk theorem, a norm
is an implicit dynamic agreement between the workers in a ¯rm. Of course, because agents have the
option to separate, matching is endogenous and the standard folk theorem for in¯nitely repeated
games between a given set of agents (see for example Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) does not
apply. In deriving equilibrium, we will be looking for those strategies that can support social
norms of cooperation in the presence of endogenous matching.
Two remarks are worth noting at this point. First, in concentrating on equilibria that are supported
by strategies speci¯c to each ¯rm's norm, the focus is on pure strategy equilibria. Nothing prevents
workers from playing a mixed strategy, and such equilibria may exist. We consider it part of the
contribution that the results on the coexistence of di®erent (good and bad) norms do not rely on
mixed strategies. Second, the main objective of this paper is to derive those competing norms
that exhibit the highest degree of cooperation. As is the case with the standard folk theorem, any
individually rational payo® can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Whenever a worker is matched to a new ¯rm, she forms a belief about the norm in that ¯rm.
Given the norm, i.e. belief about the strategy of all other m¡1 workers, an optimal strategy must
be a best response. In addition, equilibrium requires that adhering to the norm is individually
incentive compatible. An equilibrium is then described by a rule, such that given the best response
of all other workers in the economy, each player chooses e®ort to maximize expected discounted
13The assumption of this particular monitoring technology is without loss of generality. In section 5 the more
general case is solved where with probability ¯ < 1; a worker's e®ort is monitored ex post. Note that in matches
with 2 workers only, ¯ is always equal to 1: after realization of Q; a worker who knows her own e®ort can deduce
the other employee's e®ort with probability 1.
8utility. Suppose that all other workers cooperate, cooperation is a best response only if the payo®
is higher from cooperating, and remaining matched to the ¯rm with a norm of cooperation. It is
precisely the separation that will determine the equilibrium in the economy as a whole. A norm of
cooperation is not merely the choice of e®ort, but also the decision not to separate. A worker's best
response will depend on her belief whether her colleagues will cooperate and decide not to separate.
The incentive compatibility constraint will ultimately tie down the economy's equilibrium. This is
precisely the role of di®erent types of norms. Since free riding in a cooperating ¯rm has a higher
immediate payo®, the distribution of ¯rms, in particular the ones with a bad norm, will constitute
a su±ciently high threat through separation so as to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
Equilibrium is then determined by all individuals' best replies within a ¯rm's norm, given they
are incentive compatible (i.e. given the distribution of norms in the economy). The incentive
compatibility constraint ties down the equilibrium distribution of norms.
Two more remarks are worth noting. First, all matches must be individually rational. For sym-
metric exogenous sharing rules, this is always satis¯ed as matches are formed instantaneously and
being matched has a higher value than being unmatched. The issue does have immediate rele-
vance in the case of endogenous sharing rules. We will take up the issue in section 4. Second, the
assumption of having more than two workers in a ¯rm (m > 2) is not without consequences. In
matches of two, punishment is costly: the punisher is separated as well as the punished. This gives
rise to problems of renegotiation proofness.14 In the case of m > 2; the issue does not arise as
the ¯rm's norm does not disappear. By assuming that only one worker at the time gets separated
exogenously and by considering non-cooperative equilibrium (i.e. unilateral deviations only), the
non-separated workers remain matched and keep adhering to the norm with one newly matched
worker.
3 The Main Result: Strati¯cation
The model is ¯rst solved for exogenously given symmetric sharing rules (see for example Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988)). This assumption implies si(Q) = sj(Q) = s;8i;j 2 n. The problem individuals
face at the beginning of each period is to choose e®ort in order to maximize the discounted value.
We will now construct the incentives in the case where some ¯rms c 2 C ½ N exist where workers
choose to cooperate and choose not to separate unless other workers deviate. Consider a ¯rm
where all other workers cooperate and choose a level of e®ort eo: In addition, you expect them not
to separate if output Q = Q(eo). Then the option value of cooperation (i.e. choosing e = eo) V o




o + ®[EV ¡V
o] (2)
The °ow utility a worker gets is uo and after each period, she only gets separated from the ¯rm due
to exogenous break up. This happens with probability ®: In the case of separation, the expected
utility when rematched is EV . Below, we will derive EV explicitly. Whether or not cooperation is
an equilibrium depends on the option value of defecting instead of cooperating in this high norm









Defecting yields a higher utility ud > uo but implies that at the end of the period, the worker
will get separated. Output is then observed to be below the optimal level Q < Q(eo); and the
monitoring technology identi¯es the defector with probability one.
In contrast, when matched to a ¯rm with a norm of non-cooperation, a worker's best response is
to choose e®ort such that it maximizes the one period utility and to separate at the end of the
period. The option value is then equal to the °ow value of one period of non-cooperation plus the
discounted expected value of a future match:
rV
¤ = u
¤ + [EV ¡ V
¤] (4)
Note that it is su±cient to observe whether the other workers in the ¯rm have been matched
together before to distinguish whether the norm is in C or in D. Because exogenous separation is
assumed to happen one at the time, a worker matched to all newly matched colleagues deduces
that the norm is D. This works like a public randomization device in matches between two players
(see for example Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
The crucial variable here is the expected value of a future match EV: It is the belief any worker
has about the whole population of workers' behavior. A ¯rst preliminary result is that a strategy
where none of the workers cooperates is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (No Cooperation) Non Cooperative behavior, e = e¤ in all ¯rms in N is an
equilibrium
Proof. If there is no cooperation in none of the ¯rms, then the option value in all ¯rms is V ¤: Since
all ¯rms are identical, the expected value of a future match is EV = V ¤. As a result, the worker









, the solution of which by de¯nition
of the static Nash equilibrium is ei = e¤
i. Because workers in all ¯rms are indi®erent between
rematching and remain matched to the current partner (EV = V ¤), an equilibrium may involve
any separation strategy, i.e. with any probability 2 [0;1].
15For a time interval [0;t], the expected value V o satis¯es
(1 +rt)V o = uot + (1 ¡®t)V o + ®tEV
which implies equation (2).
10Now suppose a newly matched worker believes that her new ¯rm has a norm of cooperation. Her





This is a necessary condition for a worker to be induced to cooperate in a high norm ¯rm, rather
than free ride on the other members and rematch in the next period. From equations (2) and (3),







r (1 ¡ ®)
1 + r
EV (6)
the °ow utility from cooperating must be large enough to make cooperating incentive compatible.
It is therefore a function of ud; the utility of deviating, and of EV; the expected value of rematching.
The value of rematching is determined by the distribution of norms in the economy, and it is easy
to see that, in order to induce the worker to cooperate rather than free ride, the utility from
cooperating must be larger the larger the expected outside option EV:
The outside option will pinn down the equilibrium distribution of ¯rm norms in the economy. Let
F(n) be the cumulative density function of all norms in the economy. Since we are constructing
equilibrium where the norm is either one of two types: the norm c 2 C with the optimal level
of e®ort and no endogenous separation or the norm d 2 D the static Nash equilibrium level of
e®ort followed by immediate separation. Let F(c) = f and F(d) = 1 ¡ f: Then in each period of
time, the total mass of separated workers is proportional to 1¡f + ®f; all the bad norm workers
rematch each period and only the exogenously separated good norm workers do so. As a result,




1 ¡ f + ®f
(7)
This now determines the expected outside option from rematching: EV = pV o + (1 ¡ p)V ¤: The
expected value from a match is the weighted sum of the values of each type of ¯rm. We can now
state the main result.
Theorem 2 (Strati¯cation) There exists a pair (r;®) such that for any r 2 (0;r] and for any
® 2 (0;®]; an equilibrium exists where a fraction f of ¯rms c 2 C ½ N have a norm for cooperation,
with









Proof. Consider the following strategy: a worker chooses: 1. e = e¤ if the the other workers
in her ¯rm were matched together in the last period and remains matched if Q ¸ Qo; and 2.
11e = e¤ and separation otherwise. Given this strategy, substitutin the expected value of a match
EV = pV o + (1 ¡ p)V ¤ in equations (2), (3), (4) implies
rV
o = u
















We can now calculate the incentive compatibility constraint (5) which implies
u
o ¸ °u




r + p+ ®(1 ¡ p)
r + 1
(10)
It su±ces to demonstrate the existence of a non negative pair (r;®) such that condition (9) is
satis¯ed and such that no worker in a non cooperating ¯rm wants to deviate, i.e. e¤
i = argmaxei V ¤:
To establish (9) we can choose an r and ® to satisfy (9) with equality. To see this is possible, note
that limr!0(lim®!0°) = 0 and limr!1(lim®!1°) = 1; and that
d°
d® > 0 and
d°
dr > 0; making use
of equation (7). Since by de¯nition, uo;u¤,and ud satisfy ud ¸ uo ¸ u¤, we choose (r;®) so that
uo = °ud + (1 ¡ °)u¤: Now, for a given (r;®) < (r;®); the IC constraint is satis¯ed. Using (7)
and (10) to substitute at the IC constraint (9), yields equation (8).
Equation (9) ensures that no worker in a ¯rm with a norm for cooperation wants to deviate. We
now verify deviations by workers in low e®ort ¯rms. Suppose she chooses a level of e®ort e 6= e¤,
then by de¯nition of Nash equilibrium, her utility u(ei;e¤
¡i) < u¤: Given the separation strategy of
her coworkers, she will be separated with probability 1; giving her the same expected continuation
value. As a result, her option value from choosing e 6= e¤ is lower than V ¤:
The fraction of ¯rms with a norm of cooperation f as derived in the theorem is the upper bound.
It now follows immediately that an economy where all ¯rms have a norm for cooperation (i.e.
f = 1) cannot be an equilibrium. The outside option after separation is no worse, which makes
cooperation not credible. This is con¯rmed by mere observation of equation (9). When f = 1;
then p = ° = 1: Since ud is strictly larger than uo; the IC constraint is always violated. The way
the upper bound (8) is determined is precisely by solving for highest possible f such that the IC
is binding. Note that though workers are identical, and even with mobility, wages (and for that
matter option values) di®er between ¯rms. There is a gap between the utility derived from being
in the high norm ¯rm compared to the utility in the low ¯rm. This gap is necessary to make
cooperation incentive compatible.
An Example and Some Comparative Statics Results
We illustrate the result with a simple example. Let m = 3, Q =
P
iei and C(e) =
e2
2 : Output is
shared equally s(Q) =
1





and the optimal e®ort and utility eo = 1;uo =
1
2: Deviating when both other partners supply
12optimal e®ort implies ed = 1
3;ud = 13
18: Suppose that the rate of discounting is r = 0:1 and that the
exogenous separation rate ® = 0:1: Then Theorem 2 allows us to calculate f; and from equation
(8) it follows that f ¼ 0:86. Eighty six percent of the ¯rms have a norm of cooperation, with the
remaining fourteen percent having a norm of non cooperation.
Separation Rate. The exogenous rate of separation has two di®erent e®ects. It determines the
fraction of high cooperation jobs that are opened each period of time, and as a result, the expected
value of a new match EV: Second, it also determines the probability with which cooperative












The higher the exogenous separation rate, the more attractive free riding becomes and as a result,
the higher the fraction of ¯rms with bad norms needs to be in order for cooperation to remain
incentive compatible.
Discounting. An increase in the interest rate implies that the future is discounted more which
makes workers more myopic. The more myopic workers are, the less they care about future low
utility matches in their trade o® between current e®ort and future utility. It follows that a larger














In the limit of complete myopia, the future is not valued at all, so that all ¯rms are non-cooperative.
As was shown in Theorem 2, there is however a upper limit r in order to assure existence.
Firm Size. The e®ect of larger teams implies that free riding becomes more interesting. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in m results in a higher value ud; while keeping uo and u¤ constant. This in
turn brings about a larger fraction of norms of non cooperation. Free riding is more lucrative,
hence punishment is required to be stronger (i.e. a larger probability of a bad match). Formally, we







(m ¡ 1)eo + ed
i















(r + 1)uo ¡ rud ¡u¤ < 0
The larger the teams, the lower the fraction of cooperating ¯rms.
Applying competing norms to the ¯rm environment seems to make sense, given the observed
mobility of employees between di®erent ¯rms. The endogenous strati¯cation may be more generally
applied in other social environments. As alluded to in the introduction, religions in the US face
13substantial mobility of its members. Iannaccone (1992, p.272) reports that "90% of cult converts
drop out within a few years, and 40% of all Protestants change denomination at least once [...and
that there is] considerable "internal" mobility across di®erent branches of Judaism and among
Catholic parishes with very di®erent styles of worship". She considers religions as club goods where
religion is an object of choice and with the degree of participation voluntarily accepted. A similar
reasoning applies to secret societies. Though often referred to by both insiders and outsiders
as one society, "the lodge" for example, there are many di®erent local branches competing for
members. Finally, it has been argued by biologists that "social behavior" of some animals includes
mobility between groups. Wolves living in packs for example, expel members who violate the rules.
Expelled wolves usually try and join another pack. Some of the wolves also leave voluntarily in an
attempt to be become the alpha wolf in another pack. This is related to the presence of internal
authority, an issue to which we will turn in the next section.
In a more typical economic environment, we could think of competing norms as a version of
Tiebout's theory of local public goods. In fact, the social capital associated to the norm can
be interpreted as a local public good. By "voting with their feet" citizens move between di®er-
ent neighborhoods and sort themselves into homogeneous neighborhoods. Heterogeneity between
neighborhoods increases. This is often applied to the case of heterogeneous citizens ¯nancing a
local public good (e.g. education). What the theory of competing norms shows, is that even
with identical citizens and with su±cient mobility, neighborhoods will have di®erent degrees of
contribution to the public good (and di®erential degrees of turnover).
4 The Market for Authority: Wage-Tenure Schedules
The strati¯cation result derived in the previous section has one salient feature: the option value
in a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation is strictly higher than the option value when the norm is
non cooperation: V o > V ¤: All workers strictly prefer joining a high norm ¯rm. Deriving this
result when sharing rules are exogenous yield involuntary strati¯cation. Because the market for
new job openings in the high norm ¯rms is missing, unmatched workers cannot outbid each other.
If the argument applies, such a market would lower the wage received upon entry in a ¯rm c; up to
the point where workers are indi®erent between entering a ¯rm with a high norm or a low norm:
V o = V ¤. This type of voluntary strati¯cation implies that the compensation packages (often
referred to as performance bonds) in high norm ¯rms exhibit "backloading": wages increase with
tenure which results in an authority relation between junior entrants and senior incumbents. In this
section, the objective is to introduce such a market for authority. Though wage-tenure schedules
arise naturally, it will be shown that authority is limited, and that involuntary strati¯cation is
robust to the introduction of the market for authority.
We distinguish between junior and senior workers, indexed by the subscript j and s respectively.
Junior workers are new entrants to the ¯rm. Seniors are all other incumbent workers. Being
14junior lasts until a senior gets separated (or until the junior gets separated herself). In every
¯rm, there is one junior and m ¡ 1 identical seniors.16 The model is as before, where output
shares for juniors are sj(Q) and ss(Q) for seniors. As a result, the °ow utility to a any worker is
ui = si (Q(e)) ¡ C(e);8i 2 fj;sg: For analytical tractability of some of the results, we make the
following simplifying assumption: the technology is additively separable in e®ort ant the sharing
rule is linear:
Assumption A: Q(e) =
P
i ei and si(Q(e)) = siQ(e)
For a given sharing rule fsj;ssg; we can now derive the equivalents to equations (2),(3),(4), taking
into account that V o
j is in general di®erent from V o
s : In the ¯rms of type d, all workers are newly
matched and the surplus is split equally. The main di®erence in the option value is at the level of


















s + ®[EV ¡V
o
s ] (12)
The fundamental di®erence here is that when joining a ¯rm of type c; as a junior there is the
prospect of becoming a senior. Once a senior has been separated exogenously, the junior gets
promoted to senior and a new junior is hired. Because a senior in general receives a higher
share from the output than a junior, here is a gap between the option value of a senior and
that of a junior. Let ¢ be de¯ned as ¢ = V o
s ¡ V o





EV ¡ V o
j + (m¡ 1)¢
i
: Substituting out EV in equations (11) and (12), it is easy







and that it is decreasing in sj.





s = eo; and uo
i = si(Qo) ¡ c(eo); the utility di®erence is equal to uo
s ¡ uo
j =
ss (Qo) ¡ sj (Qo): Under budget balancing, sj(Q) + (m ¡ 1)ss(Q) = Q which implies uo
s ¡ uo
j =
16There is no reason to assume that ex ante bargaining between all parties will treat all senior incumbents equally.
What is captured here is that all m ¡ 1 incumbents bargain jointly with the new entrant. This reduces the split
of the surplus to a two party bargaining problem, which is better documented in the literature than multi agent
bargaining problems. For a given bargaining solution, the model could be extended to the case of a complete
seniority schedule.
17For a time interval [0;t] the equation (11) is derived from
(1 +rt)V o
j = uo
jt +®tEV +(1 ¡ ®t)
£
(m ¡1)®tV o









(r + m®)(m ¡ 1)
< 0
This completes the proof.
It immediately follows from observation of equation (13) that for sj = ss; there is no di®erence
in the option value of juniors and seniors: ¢ = 0 and that for any ss > sj; ¢ is strictly positive.












;8i 2 fj;sg (14)
As before, the utility of a non cooperative partnership will be determined by the static Nash
equilibrium payo® u¤ and the expected continuation payo® EV : rV ¤ = u¤+[EV ¡ V ¤]: Incentive





i ;8i 2 fj;sg (15)
Incentive compatibility ensures a worker will not deviate once a job has been accepted. With
authority, the ¯rm in addition has to ensure that these rules are individually rational for the junior
worker. Workers may decide to reject o®ers which give a very low current option value. A junior
worker will accept an o®er of a match to a cooperating ¯rm, as long as the option value of that
match is at least as high as the option value of sampling a ¯rm with a norm d. As a result,





Note that this does not imply that the °ow utility from a match with a cooperating ¯rm should be
at least as high as the utility from a match with a non-cooperating ¯rm: uo
j ¥ u¤. In fact, when
the IR constraint is satis¯ed, utility uo
j may even be negative. The following lemma derives the
lower bound on sj:











At sj = sj, V o
j = V ¤ and any worker is indi®erent between joining ¯rm with a norm of type c or a
¯rm with a norm of type d: Given this sharing rule, there is no longer any involuntary strati¯cation,
in the sense that workers are indi®erent and hence equally well o® in both types of ¯rms. That does
however not rule out the existence of the two types of di®erent norms. Proposition 2 establishes
the existence of equilibrium and derives the distribution of ¯rms in the presence of authority. This
Proposition is the equivalent of Theorem 2, where sj = ss.
16Proposition 2 Under assumption A; there exists a pair (b r; b ®) such that for any r 2 (0; b r] and for
any ® 2 (0; b ®]; and for a sharing rule fsj;ssgc;8c 2 C, where sj 2 [sj;ss], an equilibrium exists
where a fraction f of ¯rms c 2 C ½ N have a norm of cooperation, with
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The proposition states that equilibrium exhibiting authority relations within ¯rms with a norm of
cooperation, exists. In fact, any type of authority is an equilibrium (i.e. the proposition holds for
any feasible sj) where all ¯rms in C adhere the same sharing rule. We have derived equilibrium
when authority is assumed. We now turn to endogenous authority, i.e. ¯rms choose the sharing
rule.
4.1 Limited Authority
Consider a ¯rm with a norm of cooperation. Juniors are better o® in the high norm ¯rm than in a
low norm ¯rm as long as the IR constraint (16) holds without equality. If a senior has the power
to negotiate the contract prior to the production stage, then Lemma 3 shows that whatever the
equilibrium in the economy, she increases her option value by decreasing sj:
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which is negatives since budget balance implies that
@ss
@sj < 0.
Consider this is a two player bargaining problem between all identical seniors (or one represen-
tative) and one junior. Given individual rationality and the fact that matching is frictionless
(rematching happens instantaneously in case the bargain breaks down), the junior is willing to
accept any sharing rule sj such that V o
j ¸ V ¤. A junior will not reject an o®er with a lower
sj (even if that yields a current °ow value uo
j = sj(Qo) ¡ c(eo) that is smaller than u¤ or even
negative) since the option value in the high norm is above the option value in the low norm. An
17equilibrium with endogenous sharing rules is now as before, with the additional requirement that
the budget balancing sharing rule fsj;ssgc ;8c 2 C for each ¯rm is optimally chosen to maximize
V o
s , given the choice of an optimal sharing rules by all other ¯rms fsj;ssg¡c ;8 ¡ c(6= c) 2 C. At
¯rst sight, it looks like seniors will want to choose sj as low as possible (sj = sj), from Lemma
3. However, Proposition 3 establishes that there is a limit to the authority senior incumbents can
exercise. It establishes conditions under which incumbents do not want to lower the share sj: The
reason is that when lowering sj the ICj constraint is violated, so the ¯rm ¯nds it optimal to set
sj = fsjg¡c :
Proposition 3 (Limited Authority) Under assumption A; there exists a pair (r¤;®¤) and an b r
such that for any r 2 [r¤; b r] and for any ® 2 (0;®¤); an equilibrium exists where seniors in a ¯rm
c 2 C with a norm of cooperation, choose fsj;ssgc = fsj;ssg¡c, satisfying sj 2 [sj;ss] and where
the fraction f of ¯rms in C is
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Proof. We proceed to prove the proposition in two steps. First, in Lemma 4 we show that, for
a given sharing rule of all other ¯rms fsj;ssg¡c, ¯rm c's best response is fsj;ssgc = fsj;ssg¡c :
Then we apply Proposition 2 to show existence and derive f as in equation (19).
Lemma 4 (Best Response) Under assumption A; and provided ICj is binding, there exists
a pair (r¤;®¤); such that for any r 2 (r¤;1] and for any ® 2 (0;®¤); a ¯rm i's best response
fsj;ssgc ;8c 2 C satis¯es fsj;ssgc = fsj;ssg¡c :
Proof. The constraint ICj binding implies, from equation (15) that V o
j = V d
j : From equations





















The problem of the senior is to choose sj (and as a result ss; from budget balancing) in order to
maximize V o




j ¸ V d
j
Since V o
s is always increasing for decreasing sj (from Lemma 3) it su±ces to verify whether for a





















We now show that there exists a pair (r¤;®¤) for which equation (20) holds with equality. To see
this, we consider two extreme points. At r = 0; equation (20) holds with strict inequality for any












1+r = Qd > 0
At r = 1; the inequality is violated if
Q
o 1





which is the case for all ® 2 (0;®¤), where ®¤ solves equation (22) with equality (note that the
left hand side is monotonically decreasing in ® and goes to zero as ® goes to in¯nity). It now
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A decrease in sj implies a higher marginal e®ect on V o
j than on V d
j : Given that ICj is binding
for the strategy fsj;ssg¡c by all other norms ¡c 2 C, it follows that V o
j = V d
j ; for fsj;ssgc =
fsj;ssg¡c. Equation (23) implies that V o
j < V d
j for fsjgc < fsjg¡c implying that the best response
is fsj;ssgc = fsj;ssg¡c : This completes the proof of the Lemma.
The proof of Proposition 3 is now nearly complete. We only need to show that there is an r¤ < b r;
so that Proposition 2 applies. For any b r; there exists an ® low enough such that this is satis¯ed.





Qo(1 ¡ r¤) + Qd (r¤+®)(r¤+m®)
(1+r¤)2
> 0





Qo ¡Qd < 0
As a result, there is always an r¤ < b r: This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
19The intuition is that even though the seniors' value is increasing for a decreasing sj; the incentive
compatibility constraint of the juniors is a®ected by the change in sj: What the proposition shows
is the conditions under which a decrease in sj violates the ICj constraint. For su±ciently high
r and su±ciently low ®; a decrease in sj decreases V o
j marginally more than a decrease in V d
j ;
which violates the IC constraint. Consider V o
j = V d
j binding, then a decrease in sj decreases both
V o
j and V d
j : Since V o
j depends on both r and ®; and V d
j only on r; both values have a di®erent
marginal e®ect for di®erent pairs (r;®).
This clearly limits a ¯rm to extract authority rents from newly entering juniors. The best one
individual ¯rm can do is extract as much as the other ¯rms. Of course, there is a continuum of
equilibria in this economy: if all other ¯rms extract more from the juniors (i.e. have a low sj)
then an individual ¯rm can extract that much as well. The equilibrium level of sj does a®ect the
equilibrium distribution, and hence e±ciency. In general, the e®ect of sj on f is ambiguous.
4.2 An Example With Authority
Consider the same example as above, where each time, two senior incumbents hire one junior.
Note that assumption A is satis¯ed. The sharing rule satis¯es budget balancing: sj +2ss = 1; and
utility is given by ui = siQ ¡
e2
i
2 ;8i 2 fj;sg. Optimal e®ort is unchanged eo = 1 and adjusting
for the shares, optimal utility uo
i = si3 ¡
1
2: E®ort for deviating is determined by the ¯rst order
condition, where C0(e) = e implies si = ei. It follows that
u
d









Making use of budget balancing sj + 2ss = 1; it follows that
u
d










As before, in ¯rms with a norm of non-cooperation, output is shared equally: e¤ = 1
3 and u¤ = 5
18:
From equation (13) it follows that ¢ = 3
2
1¡3sj
r+3®: Note that for sj = ss = 1
3; we have the case of
symmetric exogenous sharing rules, and ¢ = 0: From the individual rationality condition (16),
ud




18; which is satis¯ed for sj = 0:13: Note that uo = sj3 ¡ 1
2 is
negative for any sj < 1
6 ¼ 0:17 (at sj = sj; uo
j = ¡0:097).
We ¯rst verify the conditions of Proposition 2:














9 ¡ 26sj ¡ 3s2
j
r + 1
which is satis¯ed for all the examples we give below. Hence f is derived from (18)
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It is easy to verify that this condition holds for r = ® = 0:1. And though it does not hold
for r = ® = 0:2 over the whole range of sj (in particular near sj = 1
3); it does hold over the
whole range for r = 0:3 and ® = 0:1. This implies that when it holds, authority is limited
to what the market o®ers. Firms cannot o®er an sj that is lower than the rest of the ¯rms.
If they would, that would violate the juniors' IC constraint. When this condition is not
satis¯ed, ¯rms can exercise unlimited authority by o®ering the lowest share possible.
We now plot the distribution f in function of sj from equation (24) for di®erent combinations of
r and ®: The junior's share is bounded from above by 1
3 and from below by sj = 0:13. The solid
line gives equation (24).
The share f in function of sj (r = ® = 0:1)
Below an illustration of the di®erent types of equilibrium distributions. In the ¯rst panel, f is
bounded from below for any feasible sj. The minimum level of inequality is at sj = sj; where
21f = 0:42: For r and ® even lower (equal to 0:01), the minimum level of inequality increases
f = 0:89. As ® and r go to zero, all ¯rms in the limit have a norm of cooperation. On the other
hand, as r and ® increase, the equilibrium with heterogeneity in norms eventually does not exist,
as in the example for r = ® = 0:4; and all ¯rms have a norm of non-cooperation.
In the ¯rst and the second panel, (as is the case in ¯gure 1), authority is limited (L.A.). If all ¯rms
choose pay a share sj; then the best response for a ¯rm that employs a new entrant is to o®er a
share sj: Then, even though there is a market for authority, and ¯rms can choose what share to
o®er to newly entering juniors, no ¯rm will o®er a share di®erent than any other ¯rm. If it would
do so, that would violate the junior's incentive compatibility constraint. As a result, all possible
combinations of f within the feasible range are possible (f 2 [:42;:94] in the ¯rst example and
f 2 [0;:79] in the second).
L.A. f 2 [:42;:94] (r = ® = 0:05) L.A. f 2 [0;:79] (r = 0:3;® = 0:1)
.A f = (r 0: ;® 0: ) U. . f 0: 9 ( = 0 01 ® = :1
Th th rd nd he ou th an l d pi t t e o po it ca e o un im te au ho it (U A. . W at ve
sh re j o he ¯r s o er se io in um en s i cr as th ir pt on al e b o® ri g t e l we t
junior share possible without violating the ICj constraint. In the third panel that implies that
norms of cooperation simply do not exist (f hits zero before the IR constraint is binding). In the
fourth panel, the seniors are constrained by the IR condition to o®er shares above sj. Hence the
22only equilibrium is one with unlimited authority but where a fraction of roughly half of the ¯rms
has a norm for cooperation.
Note that in general, it is ambiguous whether f is increasing in sj or not. To see this, consider
the binding IC constraint
u
o























the sign of which only depends on the sign of the numerator as ud
j ¸ u¤ and
d°




dsj + ®(m ¡1)
d¢





In this section, we verify whether the results derived are robust to changes in the assumptions.
We consider the introduction of capital in production, a general monitoring technology, non-linear
sharing rules, and deviations by coalitions.
5.1 Production with Capital
Consider the model from section 3, with capital, competing for labor. The output production
function is Cobb-Douglas with capital in addition to additively separable e®ort






This represents a situation as before: the ¯rm can announce wages depending on the whole bundle
e of e®ort choices. Firms and workers simultaneously choose capital and e®ort, respectively. Given
an e®ort bundle e, a ¯rm hires capital k at a capital rental rate R in order to maximize pro¯ts
¼ = y ¡mw(e)¡kR, where mw(e) is the total wage bill that is paid by the ¯rm, which is shared
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45.2 A General Monitoring Technology
The assumption in the model is that at the end of production, when Q is observed, the ¯rm
observes the identity of the deviating individual with probability 1. Suppose now that deviators
in m-worker teams can be detected with probability ¯(m), where ¯0 · 0 and ¯(2) = 1: The value
function for a deviator then becomes
rV
d = u






As in Theorem 2 we can derive for the generalized problem the incentive compatibility condition










r + p+ ®(1 ¡ p)
r + ® + ¯ (1 ¡ ®) + p[1 ¡ ® ¡¯ (1 ¡®)]
(27)
Calculating the proportion of cooperating ¯rms gives























The higher the probability of detecting a free rider, the higher the proportion of cooperating ¯rms.
Punishment is harsher as more agents who free ride will be caught. As a result, even with less low
norm ¯rms, the IC constraint is satis¯ed.
Earlier, we found that the e®ect of larger ¯rms, i.e. larger m; decreases the proportion of cooper-
ating ¯rms: for a given sharing rule, the bene¯ts from free riding are higher in a large ¯rm, which
requires more non-cooperating ¯rms to punish deviators. Now, this direct e®ect still exists, but in
addition, if larger ¯rms have a lower probability of detecting deviators, ¯0(m) < 0; the total e®ect
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26proofness when one individual has deviated. The second is deviations by coalitions of all m
members of a ¯rm with a norm of non-cooperation.
Renegotiation proofness is certainly a serious problem when m = 2: Punishment of the co-worker
who deviates also implies self punishment. "Firing" your partner implies that you are unmatched
yourself and that you will be randomly assigned a new partner afterwards. If you were cooperating,
punishing your partner implies that you get expected value EV which is lower than V o: As a result,
both parties would gain from renegotiating the "threatened" separation through any split of the
ensuing surplus. In our model, m > 2 and by the assumption that only one worker is exogenously
separated from the ¯rm with a norm of cooperation, incumbents never get a lower option value
V o by punishing a deviating co-worker. For them the continuation payo® of punishment is not
dominated, and hence satis¯es the criterion for renegotiation proofness in Farrell and Maskin
(1989).
Allowing for deviations by coalitions of workers certainly does change the equilibrium. In particu-
lar, a ¯rm with a low norm of cooperation would always gain by starting to cooperate. Because the
¯rm has zero mass in the economy, it is a dominant strategy for all ¯rms to cooperate. However,
cooperation in all ¯rms would not be an equilibrium since individual workers in a ¯rm now gain
from deviation: the outside option is equally good as all ¯rms are cooperating, so non-cooperation
is a dominant strategy. It follows that equilibrium does not exist. Note also that a mixed strategy
by coalitions would be problematic. Given a mixed strategy by all other ¯rms, one ¯rm's best
response is to cooperate with probability one. Being of zero mass, this does not change the incen-
tive compatibility constraint of one individual worker. This is a dominant strategy as the payo®
from cooperating is higher than not cooperating. The result is that an equilibrium that allows for
deviations by coalitions of workers does not exist, neither in pure nor in mixed strategies. This is
of course not a new discovery, because there is no general existence proof for equilibrium of large
sequential games of incomplete information.
6 Extensions
We consider two extensions to the model of section 3.
6.1 Worker Heterogeneity
Consider two types µ of workers, h and l and such that, in addition to e®ort, the worker types
are inputs in production. A worker's type µ is observable. Let ¯rms consist of m = 2 workers.
For sorting to matter, let worker types be complementary inputs: Q = ¦µµ
P
iei: There is now a
productivity gain from matches that are positively assorted, as for a given level of e®ort, Q(h;h)+
Q(l;l) > 2Q(h;l). In the earlier sections, rematching is assumed to be frictionless.18 That implies
18Eeckhout (1999) derives an equilibrium with endogenous class formation, provided there are frictions in the
matching process.
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rematched to an exogenously separated high type worker. The larger the di®erence between low
and high types, the higher the bene¯t to a low type and the higher here incentive to try a rematch
each time. This will induce her not to cooperate even if she is matched to another low type, as
she wants to try her luck by possibly rematching a high type. While increasing dispersion in the
types provides incentives for the high types to cooperate, it provides incentives for the low types
not to cooperate. The result is that the initial dispersion is exacerbated in the payo®s through
e®ort choice.
6.2 Complementary Inputs
When inputs are complementary, multiple static Nash equilibria can exist. The marginal pro-
ductivity of a worker's e®ort increases as e®ort by other workers in the ¯rm increases. As a
result, multiple ¯xed points to the static game can exist.19 Suppose there are two pure strategy
Nash equilibria with utilities associated u¤ < u¤ such that u¤ < u¤ < uo < ud. Let the corre-
sponding option values be V
¤ and V
¤ be de¯ned as above. To derive the equilibrium distribution
of ¯rm norms in this economy, consider the following expected valuation of being rematched:
EV = p1V o + p2V
¤ + p3V
¤ where p1 is the probability of matching to ¯rm with a norm for
cooperation and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1:
An equilibrium distribution will now depend on what the level of e®ort is in the ¯rms without
a norm for cooperation. The condition (5) will now write uo ¸ °1ud + °2u¤ + °3u¤: If p2 = 0
(and hence °2 = 0); the fraction of cooperating ¯rms f where the IC constraint is binding will
19Consider an example with m = 3; but where the production function is now multiplicative (i.e. e®ort is a
complementary input) Q = 3¦iei and cost of e®ort is c(ei) =
e4
i
4 ; which implies c0 = e3
i. When output is equally
shared, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: e¤ = 1 and e¤ = 0. Then either u¤ = 1
2 or u¤ = 0: The Pareto
optimal level of e®ort is eo = 3; implying that uo = 27





which solves ed =
3 p




28be smaller than if p2 = 1 ¡ p1: In fact, as p2 is increasing, f is decreasing. The value of being in
a ¯rm with a norm for non-cooperation e¤ is the lowest possible, which implies that punishment
is su±ciently severe that a large number of ¯rms with a norm for cooperation can be sustained.
In principle, any distribution of between p2 and p3 can be envisaged, as long as it satis¯es the
constraint.
Now consider the following case: let V
¤ > EV: Then a worker in a ¯rm with a norm for non-
cooperation (the higher one of the two), will not want to separate as the current value is higher
than the expected value of rematching. However, even if these non-cooperating stay together, it
will not be an equilibrium to start cooperating if the IC constraint is binding with equality. Hence
there is an equilibrium with three types of norms: high turnover, low non-cooperative e®ort; low




The theory of competing norms provides an explanation for the coexistence of heterogeneous norms
and the endogenous strati¯cation of corporate cultures. The crucial premise is that organizational
forms are in competition through the labor market. The organizational characteristics are not
explained by transaction cost di®erences between ¯rms and markets (Coase (1937), Williamson
(1975)), nor as a result of non contractible, unforeseen contingencies where ownership constitutes
the residual claimant (Grossman and Hart (1986)). We o®er a complementary explanation in the
line of Kreps (1990). The norm in our model is an implicit contract that is self enforcing. The
market environment in which this norm operates determines the outside option for workers and is
crucial for the feasibility of this implicit contract. No ¯rm with a norm of cooperation can coexist
unless there are su±cient bad norms. This is far from a theory of the ¯rm (the boundaries of a
¯rm here are exogenous). Rather, it is a theory of inequality of the ¯rm.
Since there is a gap between the utility for an entrant in a bad norm compared to the utility for
entry in a good norm, authority naturally arises by the incumbent high norm members. Wage
payments that di®er between seniors and juniors are the result from this discrepancy between
the utility derived in di®erent norms. As in Simon (1951), a new entrant is willing to enter
into an authoritative employment contract as long as that contract is better than the employment
contract in a bad norm. The important caveat of the competing norms model is that even authority
is limited by the implicit contract. We show that the implicit contract restricts the rents that the
authority of senior incumbents can extract. The nature of authority is determined/limited by the
competitive environment through the implicit contract. Authority does not, in general, eradicate
bad norms.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Given that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, IR requires that V o
j = V d
j ¸ V ¤:








j ¸ u¤: Where the IR constraint is binding, ud






j) = u¤; where sj is the the minimal sj: This is a lower bound because ud
j is increasing in sj:
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove this Proposition, we proceed by showing two Lemmata. In Lemma 5, for a given sharing
rule fsj;ssg, common to all ¯rms, we derive the equivalent distribution function as in Theorem 2.
In Lemma 6, assumption A allows us to determine that ICj is binding, and we show exisitence.
Lemma 5 For any given sharing rule fsj;ssgc;8c 2 C the fraction f1 of ¯rms with a norm for
cooperation, is given by
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r+1 and provided equilibrium exists.
Proof. Consider the same strategies as in Theorem 2. Then the proportion p of cooperating
¯rms is given by equation (7). The expected value of rematching is now EV = pV o
j + (1 ¡ p)V ¤.




































Satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint of the junior V o
j ¸ V d
j , we get condition ICj
u
o
j + ®(m ¡ 1)¢ ¸ u
d
j° + u
¤(1 ¡ °) (30)
where ° is as before and given by equation (10).
30The value equations for the senior workers are similar: V d
s for deviators and V ¤ non-cooperators:
For cooperators, the option value is rV o
s = ®[(1 ¡ p)(V ¤ ¡ V o
s ) ¡ p¢]: We then get a similar
condition ICs for the senior workers derived from V o
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j ; we can write ICs as
V
o


























r+1 (note that both are binding
at sj = ss : then ¢ = 0 and ud
s = ud












Assuming existence of a non degenerate distribution, we now proceed as in the proof of Theorem
2 by calculating the distribution. If (32) holds, from (30) (holding with equality), we can calculate
f1 which gives (18). This completes the proof.
In the following Lemma, we make use of assumption A in order to determine when ICj is binding.
Lemma 6 Under assumption A; and for any sharing rule fsj;ssg, with sj 2 [sj;ss], there exists
a pair (r1;®1) such that for any r 2 (0; e r]; and for any ® 2 (0; e ®], ICj is binding.




j: The left hand side can be written as ss(Qo) ¡ sj(Qo):













@ei = siQe ¡c0(ei) = 0; and c convex the envelope theorem implies that
@ei
@si < 0) and as a result, Qd
s ¸ Qd





For a ¯nite m; there always exists a pair (r;®) small enough such that equation (32) is satis¯ed.
To see this, for any r; let ® ·
1
m, which is su±cient. Then let (r1;®1) be chosen such that (32)
holds with equality. From Lemma 5, it follows that the binding constraint is ICj.
We can now ¯nalize the proof of Proposition 2 and derive the distribution f. As in theorem 2, there




















mQo ¡ c(eo) > u¤: Choose (r2;®2) to satisfy (30) with equality. Let
(b r; b ®) = minf(r1;®1);(r2;®2)g:Then, under assumption A; Lemma 6 holds, so that from Lemma
5, it follows that f = f1
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This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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